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Data on energy and mineral reserves suggest that natural resource abundance has not 
been a significant structural determinant of economic growth between 1970 and 1989.  
The story behind the effect of natural resources on economic growth is a complex one 
that typical growth regressions do not capture well.  Preliminary evidence suggests that 
natural resources may affect economic growth through both “positive” and “negative 
channels.”  Potential reverse causality running from these “channels” to fuel and mineral 
reserves further complicates the analysis.  I conjecture that, as economic historians 
suggest, the ability of a country to exploit its resource base depends critically on the 
nature of the learning process involved. 
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The observation that resource-poor economies can sometimes outperform resource-rich 
economies is nothing new in the field of economic history [De Long and Williamson, 
1994].  Typical examples include the Netherlands versus Spain in the 17
th century, and 
Switzerland and Japan versus Russia in the 19
th and 20
th centuries. 
Sachs and Warner [1995b] — hereafter referred to as SW — show that economies 
with a high ratio of natural resource exports to GDP in 1971 (their base year) tended to 
have low growth rates during the subsequent period 1971-89.  This negative relationship 
holds true after controlling for variables found to be important to economic growth, such 
as initial per capita income, trade policy, government efficiency, and investment rates. 
The consequences of the SW paper for economic development are far reaching.  
SW conclude that “one of the surprising features of modern economic growth is that 
economies abundant in natural resources have tended to grow slower than economies 
without substantial natural resources
1.”  This way of formulating their result is 
misleading.  SW stop short of making specific recommendations for resource exporting 
countries.  However, they practically leave us with the impression that developing 
countries should leave their natural resources undiscovered and/or unexploited. 
The purpose of this paper is to check whether SW's negative relationship between 
natural resource abundance and economic growth holds when one uses actual data about 
energy, mineral reserves and production.  The SW result is not robust to changes in the 
measure of natural-resource abundance from trade-flows to reserves or production.  
Natural resources per se do not seem to have a significant influence on growth rates.   Page 3 of 40  
 
I will not contest the observation made by SW that natural resource export 
intensity is associated with slower rates of economic growth.  It is not the objective of 
this paper to argue that countries rich in natural resources unambiguously have faced or 
face better growth prospects.  However, the proposition that natural resource production 
comes systematically at the expense of the manufacturing sector, learning-by-doing, and 
thus economic growth is not supported by the data. 
What are the necessary conditions for a manufacturing sector to be built around a 
comparative advantage in natural resources? A resource-rich country may export few 
natural resources per se at the same time that its manufacturing sector exports embody 
intensively its natural resources.  There is no clear historical evidence that, as SW assume 
in their working paper, learning-by-doing is restricted to the manufacturing sector, and is 
nonexistent in other sectors such as resource production or agriculture.  Economic 
historian Gavin Wright suggests that if resources are “developed” through advanced 
forms of knowledge development, their spillover effects may be just as powerful as 
anything done in manufacturing. 
Natural resource are not significant determinants of economic growth in this 
sample because of coexistence of what I call “positive” and “negative channels” of effect 
running from natural resources to factors that affect economic growth.  Evidence of the 
existence of both types of channel will be presented. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews key literature regarding the 
role of natural resources; Section III presents the data on natural resource production and 
reserves and investigates the empirical relationship between primary exports, resource 
production and reserves, and economic growth; Section IV specifies the growth 
                                                                                                                                                                     
1 That’s the opening sentence of the abstract of Sachs and Warner (1995b) Page 4 of 40  
 
regressions, estimation and test results are provided; Section V interprets the results and 
investigates evidence of channels of effect of natural resources on economic growth; 
Section VI concludes. 
II. Literature review 
 
 
Matsuyama [1992] derives a formal model of what is called the “linkages approach” to 
the analysis of the role of natural resources for growth.  He investigates the role of 
agriculture in a model in which manufacturing is characterized by learning-by-doing.  He 
concludes that forces that push the economy away from manufacturing and towards 
agriculture lower the growth rate of the economy, by reducing learning-induced growth 
of manufacturing.  Since the learning effects are external to the firm, market equilibrium 
is not efficient. 
Feenstra [1990] as well as Grossman and Helpman [1991] have worked out 
models where a country that is lagging technologically can be driven by trade to 
specialize in traditional goods and thereby experience a reduction in its long run rate of 
growth.  Such models are formalizations of old arguments about infant industries and the 
need for temporary protection to catch up with more advanced countries [Rodriguez and 
Rodrik, 1999]. 
In the NBER working paper version of their article, SW generalize Matsuyama's 
model using the framework of the “Dutch disease” model.  In the Dutch disease model, 
named after the disappointing economic experience of the Netherlands (and the U.K.) 
following the discovery of North Sea oil in the 1970s, the economy has three sectors: a 
tradable natural resource sector, a tradable (non-resource) sector, and a non-traded sector.  
The greater the natural resource endowment, the higher is the demand for non-tradable Page 5 of 40  
 
goods, and consequently, the smaller will be the allocation of labor and capital to the 
manufacturing sector.  This “Dutch disease” is an actual problem for the economy if there 
is something special about the sources of growth in manufacturing, such as the learning 
by doing stressed by Matsuyama. 
When a natural resource has high transportion costs, then its physical availability 
within the economy is essential for the introduction of a new industry or a new 
technology.  De Long and Williamson [1994] remind us that coal and iron ore deposits 
were a prerequisite for the development of an indigenous steel industry in the late 19
th 
century.  Resource-rich economies such as Britain and Germany grew particularly rapidly 
at the end of the last century.  In contrast, for Carlo Bardini [1997] the poor performance 
of the Italian economy before World War I is explained by the lack of domestic coal 
reserves, which resulted in a backward economic structure of production. 
J.H. Habakkuk [1962] linked high productivity in the US to resource abundance, 
starting a long debate on nineteenth-century American development.  The timing of the 
U.S. leadership in industrial production coincides with its leadership in the production of 
coal, copper, petroleum, iron ore, zinc, phosphate, molybdenum, lead and tungsten.  The 
United States was uniquely situated with respect to the availability and cost of mineral 
resources; at least as importantly, the range of available minerals was far wider than in 
any other country. 
Gavin Wright [1990] analyses the reasons behind American technological 
leadership in manufactured goods at the turn of the 20
th century.  He estimates the factor 
content of trade in manufactured goods.  The outstanding characteristic of American 
manufacturing exports was their intensity in non-reproducible natural resources.  Such Page 6 of 40  
 
resource intensity had been increasing over the half-century prior to the Great 
Depression. 
David and Wright [1997] challenge the premise that resource abundance simply 
reflected a country’s geological endowment of mineral deposits.  They argue, in the 
century following 1850, the US exploited its natural resource potential to a far greater 
extent than other countries, and did so across virtually the entire range of industrial 
minerals.  Natural resource abundance was an endogenous, “socially constructed” 
condition that was not geologically pre-ordained.  They hint at the fact that strong 
“positive feedbacks” even in the exploitation of depletable resources, were responsible 
for the explosive growth of the US “minerals economy.” 
Mitchener and McLean [forthcoming and 1999] study convergence in US regional 
growth from 1880 to 1980.  Their results suggest that in 1880 states obtained an 
advantage in productivity from the mining industry independent of the other influences. 
They find that the independent influence of mineral abundance on state productivity was 
strongest at the end of the 19
th century.  Their argument is that in frontier states, where 
labor and capital are often in scarce supply, a large initial endowment of resources 
improves opportunities for economic agents to acquire scarce factors quickly, and to 
grow extensively, acquiring more capital and labor so the resource base can be further 
exploited.  Bernard and Jones [1996] suggest that the resource sector may be important 
for explaining productivity differences across states as late as the 1980s. 
For SW one of the characteristic features of modern economic growth is that 
economies with abundant natural resources have recently tended to grow less rapidly than 
those without.  In the model they present at the end of their working paper, they assume Page 7 of 40  
 
that learning-by-doing is proportional to the relative size of the manufacturing sector. If 
their model correctly describes an important feature of modern economic development, 
those countries which have been lucky enough to exploit their natural resources at a time 
when they were essential to the development of an industrial sector should still be 
experiencing higher growth rates because of the inherited size of their industrial sectors. 
Gallup and Sachs [1998] regress levels of per capita income on non-conventional 
explanatory variables.  They find that levels of per capita income across countries in 1995 
are positively related to deposits of some natural resources.  This implies that measures of 
mineral reserves included in a cross-country regression partly capture the usual 
disadvantage of being a technological frontrunner.  In other words, natural resources are 
highly correlated with original GDP per worker, a variable traditionally included to 
capture conditional convergence effects.  This tends to understate the advantageous role 
natural resources play for growth, even controlling for initial per capita income. 
The economic disaster of resource-abundant Sub-Saharan Africa (and to a lesser 
extent Latin America) is used as the prime example of the detrimental effect of natural 
resources can have on economic growth and development.  Lane and Tornell [1995] 
argue that a windfall coming from a terms-of-trade improvement or a discovery of natural 
resource deposits can lead to a “feeding frenzy” in which competing factions fight for 
natural resource rents, and end up inefficiently exhausting the public good. 
The experience of developed countries seems to contrast with that of LDC’s in 
this respect.  The key to this puzzle may be that in a country with a well defined and well-
functioning property right system, a natural resource boom would probably not lead to a 
war of attrition.  In a society with a shakier social infrastructure and dysfunctional Page 8 of 40  
 
economic policy, such booms may lead to wasteful rent seeking and possible rising 
inequality, making consensus on growth enhancing policies hard to reach. 
Angus Deaton [1999] argues that the revenues commodity exports provide are a 
potential source of funds for investment.  Even temporary price booms provide windfalls 
that, if invested, can enhance future growth.  The importation of investment has been a 
preeminent feature of the American economic development in the 19
th century and of the 
East Asian economic “miracle” [Dani Rodrik, 1994]. 
For Angus Deaton, in Africa, the problem has been the low quality of investment 
and the absence of complementary factors, particularly education. The degree of 
processing in Africa's exports is generally low.  Ownership of minerals is often 
concentrated, so that increases in commodity prices lead to increases in income 
inequality.  Nonetheless, he argues that there is a strong relationship between GDP 
growth and commodity price growth, with commodity price growth leading economic 
growth.  This is reminiscent of the “Big Push” model of Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 
[1989]. 
Brad De Long [2000] optimistically proposes that the tropics' comparative 
advantage, now and in the future, is in light manufacturing.  Within a generation the 
tropics will import food on a large scale from the temperate zone.  He reasons that the 
key is productivity in manufacturing and services, where the tropics do not have any 
ecological disadvantage.  In this context, provided these countries succeed in “getting 
economic policy right,” tropical countries with a substantial endowment in natural 
resources may see this comparative advantage reinforced rather than weakened, and have 
a chance of establishing “endogenous growth.” Page 9 of 40  
 
III. Data 
When one starts thinking about the effect of natural resources on economic growth, three 
options offer themselves: natural resource exports, production or reserves.  The claim that 
being a resource export dependent country slows down its expected rate of growth, is a 
different claim than arguing that high mineral reserves or production of those reserves is 
associated with slower rates of growth. 
Once out of the 2-by-2 Hecksher-Ohlin model, there is no guarantee that higher 
relative endowment of a specific factor (say, mineral reserves) will necessarily translate 
to exports being more natural-resource intensive than imports.  Countries tend to export 
goods which embody intensively the factors that they are relatively well endowed in, but 
this need not hold for any specific good.  Elasticities of substitution for production and 
consumption play a crucial role.  Conversely, observing that a country’s exports are more 
resource-intensive than its imports does not necessarily imply a higher relative 
endowment in those resources.  See Leamer [1980] for seminal work on these issues. 
It is worthwhile investigating separately the effects of natural resource 
endowment, production and trade on economic growth. SW’s preferred measure of 
resource dependence is the ratio of primary-product exports to GDP in 1970.  This paper 
considers production and reserves data gathered from three sources about land, fuels and 
minerals.  Land, measured as the log of the ratio of total land area to population in 1971, 
comes (as in SW) from Table 1 of the FAO’s 1971 Production Yearbook.  Oil, gas and 
coal reserves as well as production data come from the US Department of Energy [1999].  
Series for oil, gas and coal reserves per 1,000 inhabitants are labeled OILR, GASR and Page 10 of 40  
 
COALR respectively.  Similarly, series for oil, gas and coal production per 1,000 
inhabitants are labeled OILP, GASP and COALP respectively. 
Mineral production and reserves data from the U.S. Geological Survey, Minerals 
Program
 (U.S.G.S.) [1999] are for the availability per country of 57 different mineral 
resources.  The limited number of degrees of freedom in a cross-section of countries 
makes estimating a separate coefficient for each of these minerals virtually impossible.  
In an attempt to summarize this rich data, I have calculated separately the first two 
principal components for these series.  These indexes will be referred to hereafter as 
MINR1 and MINR2 in the case of reserves data, and MINP1 and MINP2 in the case of 
production data. 
The method of principal components offers little hope of enabling me to give a 
specific interpretation to the resulting index, other than to say tautologically that MINR1 
is the first principal of these series of mineral reserves, for example.  However, principal 
components extract by construction a maximum of information from the data (given the 
arbitrary number of principal components which are considered), provide us with two 
perfectly orthogonal series, and offer the advantage of being less arbitrary than some 
other indexes.  Other types of indexes have been used (not reported) and lead to similar 
conclusions. 
Since the use of reserve data is essential to this paper, it is necessary to discuss 
how these measures are developed and what they reflect.  Mineral geologists scoff at 
reserve numbers, and no one believes that they really represent comprehensive measures 
of “resource endowments.” “Working inventory” is a commonly used term.  Reserves 
numbers are sensitive to technology, costs, financial and government structures and the Page 11 of 40  
 
product price.  While these limitations are acknowledged, in order to come as close to the 
concept of resource endowment as possible, the broadest definition of mineral reserve, 
what the U.S.G.S. calls the Reserve Base, will be used. They define it as: 
“That part of identified resource that meets specified minimum physical and chemical 
criteria related to current mining and production practices.  Including those for grade, 
quantity, thickness, and depth.  The reserve base is the in-place demonstrated (measured 
plus indicated) resource from which reserves are estimated.  It may encompass those 
parts of the resources that have a reasonable potential for becoming economically 
available within planning horizons beyond those that assume proven technology and 
current economics.  The reserve base includes those resources that are currently 
economic (reserves), marginally economic (marginal reserves), and some of those that 
are currently subeconomic (subeconomic reserves).  The term “geological reserve” has 
been applied by others generally to the reserve base category, but it may also include the 
inferred-reserve-base category; it is not part of the [U.S.G.S.] specification system.” 
U.S.G.S. [1999], Appendix D. 
One implication is that this measure of resource abundance may reflect the state 
of technological expertise that has gone into its development.  Some countries have larger 
known reserves of some minerals, not because they are better endowed than other 
countries, but because they have had earlier access to geological expertise.  Conversely, 
what about an economy where the minerals are being developed with advanced outside 
technology, while the rest of the economy is well within the technological frontier?  This 
paper does not attempt to dismiss this possible bias of stock measures.  Actually, this bias 
is part of the reason why the SW formulation can be misleading.  What the natural 
resources do to a country’s productivity and growth prospects depends on the nature of 
the learning process. 
There is a high degree of correlation between production and reserves data for oil, 
coal, gas and minerals.  This correlation is obvious for MINR1 vs. MINP1 and MINR2 
vs. MINP2 in Figure VII and Figure VII bis, which plots mineral reserves against 
minerals production. Figure VIII, IX, and X do a similar job respectively for oil, natural 
gas and coal. They also reveal strong correlation between fuel reserves and production. Page 12 of 40  
 
Table VI reports correlation coefficients for reserves and production data for oil, gas, 
coal, MINR1 and MINR2. Correlations between reserves and production all range 
between 71 and 97%. 
As Figure VII, VIII, IX, and X illustrate, data for reserves and production carry 
different, though highly correlated, information about natural resources. In order to get as 
close as possible to the concept of “abundance”, I will focus in this paper on results 
corresponding to reserves of fuels and minerals.  The regressions presented in the rest of 
the paper have been run with production data.  However, switching to production data 
does not alter the main conclusions and so they are not reported.  (They are available 
from the author upon request.) 
Endogeneity is a potential problem.  It is possible that rich countries have more 
reserves of natural resources because they have been investigating their ground longer 
and in more efficient ways.  Fuel and mineral reserves have a correlation coefficient with 
the logarithm of initial income ranging from 17 to 28%.  However, this kind of 
endogeneity biases results against the conclusions of this paper.  Natural resource 
abundance per capita partly proxies for initial output per capita and will catch part of the 
disadvantage of being a technological frontrunner; this is the case even if initial per capita 
income is controlled for.  In contrast, the correlation coefficient for land per capita is 
minus 13%.  This tends to understate the absolute value of the negative coefficient that is 
found for land.  Again, this kind of endogeneity biases results against the conclusions 
regarding land. 
How dependent are the reserve data on economic growth from 1970 to 1989?  I 
will assume that this type of endogeneity is limited and can be safely ignored.  Ideally, Page 13 of 40  
 
reserve data for the year 1970 should be used but this data is not available for many 
countries.  Alternatively, I would like to instrument for mineral and fuel reserves.  
However, satisfying instruments have not been found
2. For example, geographical 
variables have been dismissed as instruments.  These instruments will predict a 
component of natural resources which relates to belonging to one growth club versus 
another, say Sub-Saharan Africa versus ASEAN countries.  In fact, these instruments act 
like a set of dummy variables for continental membership.  They pick up the effect of 
missing variables that explains continental differences in average growth rates. 
An interesting question is whether primary export intensity is associated with 
land, fuel and natural resources.  I run regressions with SXP (the ratio of primary-product 
exports to GDP in 1970) as the dependent variable.  Fuel and minerals reserves as well as 
some control variables are considered as candidates for explanatory variables.  Table 5 
reports the results of seven regressions of this kind.  
Regressions S1 considers a constant and SOPEN, SW’s index of openness. The 
more open an economy is the smaller the ratio of its primary-product exports to GDP in 
1970.  Interestingly, SOPEN is statistically significant with a p-value of .3%.  S2 
introduces ACCESS, a dummy variable equal to 1 if a country has access to the sea.  
Access to the sea is associated with a higher share of primary-product exports in GDP.  In 
S3, LGDPEA70, the logarithm of GDP per capita in 1970, is introduced.  Higher income 
is associated with a lower share of primary exports in GDP.  However, the coefficients 
corresponding with income and access to the sea are not statistically different from zero 
and so, in S4-S7, both of these variables have been dropped. 
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S4 uses SOPEN together with land (LAND) and oil (OILR), natural gas (GASR), 
coal (COALR), and minerals (MINR1&2) reserves as regressors.  SOPEN is negatively 
associated with economic growth, but this time it is not statistically significant below a p-
value of 34%.  Land is positively and strongly associated with primary product export 
intensity at a p-value as low .4%.  At alpha below 5%, the only other significant variable 
is COALR, coal reserves.  Surprisingly, coal reserves are negatively associated with 
primary product intensity. 
S5 tests the robustness of these results to the introduction of regional dummy 
variables.  The dummy variables associated with Sub-Saharan Africa are significant with 
a p-value of .3%.  A country that is part of Sub-Saharan Africa exports an additional 7% 
of GDP as primary products.  OECD countries tend to export 6% fewer primary products 
as a share of GDP (with a corresponding p-value below 3%).  Latin-American (Asian) 
countries export a larger (smaller) share of their GDP as primary products but the 
corresponding dummies are insignificant.  
 Sub-Saharan African countries that are usually associated with low scores of 
openness are large exporters of primary products.  In the presence of dummies, openness 
is positively associated with primary export intensity (with a corresponding p-value of 
5.5%).  For natural resources, coal reserves are again negatively associated with primary 
export intensity at a very low p-value of .9%.  MINR1 is positively associated with SXP 
at a p-value of 6.8%. 
In S7, land, fuel and mineral endowments have been kept while the regional 
dummies have been dropped.  The coefficient on SOPEN switches back to a negative Page 15 of 40  
 
sign.  Coal is negative and significant. No other fuel or mineral index is significant below 
a p-value of 20%. 
The bottom of Table III reports two sets of tests, one regarding the null hypothesis 
of non-zero coefficients on fuels and minerals, the other the null hypothesis of non-zero 
coefficients on dummy variables.  The later null regarding regional dummies cannot be 
rejected below a p-value of .04%.  This indicates that there is a regional pattern to 
primary export intensity and that there are a number of missing variables.  This is an 
important topic for further research but the analysis stops here since a thorough analysis 
of the determinants of primary product trade patterns is outside the scope of this paper.  I 
cannot reject the null-hypothesis that natural resources are statistically significant in S5 at 
a p-value varying between 9 - 13%. 
Natural resources matter in determining the share of GDP composed of primary 
exports though somewhat marginally.  Regional affiliation matters more for primary 
export intensity than reserves of fuels and minerals.   Land is always a positive 
determinant of SXP. It is significant (at a p-value below, at most, 5.5%), except in S6 
where fuel and mineral reserves have been omitted.  Land, which is a key input to 
agriculture, is a more important determinant of primary export intensity than other natural 
resources.  This suggests that being relatively well endowed in land translates to primary 
(agricultural) exports somewhat more systematically than natural resources do.  It is 
notable that coal reserves are always negatively correlated with primary exports.  I 
conjecture that coal is still today associated with heavy industrialization, and thus, 
associated with secondary (rather than primary) export intensity.  See Section V for 
preliminary evidence. Page 16 of 40  
 
I turn my attention to the rates of economic growth in the sample and their 
association with natural resources.  Figures I, II and III plot GEA7090 against OILR, 
GASR and COALR.  No clear relationship emerges from these three graphs.  The same 
conclusion is reached in Figures V and VI with respect to mineral reserves.  Neither 
minerals nor fuel reserves appear to be associated with economic growth in a clear way. 
In contrast, Figure IV shows that land is negatively correlated with growth in the sample. 
SW propose a “non-parametric” test for their proposed negative relationship 
between primary export intensity and economic growth.  Are there countries that are in 
the top quartile for primary export intensity and that have sustained levels of growth 
above 2%? They only identify three such cases: Botswana, Malaysia, and Mauritius.  A 
similar test is conducted in this paper by counting countries that are in the top quartile for 
land, oil, natural gas, coal and minerals and that have sustained levels of growth above 
2%. 
Table VII reports the corresponding counts.  In the sample, a total 29 countries 
had average growth rates above 2% for the period 1970-1989.  Out of these, six countries 
scored in the top quartile in oil reserves; six countries scored in the top quartile in natural 
gas reserves; four scored in the top quartile of coal reserves; four scored in the top 
quartile of MINR1; and ten scored in the first quartile of MINR2.  In contrast, there are 
only two countries, Canada and Cameroon, in the first quartile for land that have had an 
average growth rate above 2%. 
The most salient observation is Canada, which scored in the first quartile in all six 
categories and has had an average growth rate of 2.2% over the two decades in question.  
China, Indonesia, Norway and Spain scored in three out of six categories and have had Page 17 of 40  
 
growth rates of 2.3, 4.6, 2.9 and 2.1% respectively.  Overall, 17 countries out of 29 with 
average growth rate above 2% scored in the first quartile in at least one of the six 
categories of natural resources.  SW’s non-parametric test leads to different conclusions 
when run in terms of reserves rather than primary export intensity.  This test suggests that 
while exporting primary products or being well endowed in land may be incompatible 
with fast growth in the sample, being highly endowed in fuels or minerals is not.  The 
following section proceeds to more formal tests of this conjecture. 
IV. Growth regressions 
SW mostly work with cross-country growth regressions as described in Barro and Sala-I-
Martin [1995].  Economic growth in economy i between time t=0 and t=T (here and in 
SW, 1970 and 1989) — hereafter labeled GEA7090 — is a negative function of (the 
logarithm of) initial income 
i Y0  — labeled LGDPEA70 — and a vector of structural 
characteristics of the economy 
i











Their goal is to test whether measures of resource dependence are among the 
i
o Z 's.  SW’s sample does not include Russia or Eastern Europe, as Summers and Heston 
[1991] provide no data for these countries.  SW identify and exclude six countries as 
outliers: Chad, Gabon, Guyana, Malaysia, Oman and Saudi Arabia.  However, estimation 
results when these countries are thrown back into their sample are presented.  Four other 
oil-intensive countries, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, are absent 
from their sample where there is no GDP data available for the full 1970-1989 period.  
Exclusion of these observations does not seem to drive their results. Page 18 of 40  
 
SW introduce a number of control variables to attempt to isolate the effect of 
primary export intensity.  The same control variables are used in the regressions 
presented in this section.  SOPEN is an openness variable measuring the fraction of years 
between 1965 and 1989 that the country was integrated in the global economy.  A 
country is integrated during a particular year if it maintained reasonably low tariffs and 
quotas, and did not have an excessively high black market exchange rate premium [Sachs 
and Warner, 1995a]. INV7089 is the average investment to GDP ratio during the two 
decades considered in SW.  RL is a Rule of Law index presented in Knack and Keefer 
[1995].  Finally, DTT7090, is the average annual growth rate of the log of the external 
terms of trade between 1970 and 1990 [Source: WD95].  Data on investment and income 
come from the Penn World Table (Mark 5.6) compiled by Summers and Heston [1991]. 
Tables I to IV report results.  A star indicates a variable statistically different from 
zero at a 5% level of significance, two stars, at 10%.  My goal is to illustrate the 
irrelevance of fuels and minerals reserves in growth regressions.  I have chosen a 
generous threshold for type-I error in order to reject the null hypothesis of no effect of 
natural resources on economic growth at the highest conventionally accepted level for 
“alpha.” 
Table I reproduces SW’s results from regressions of growth on their control 
variables and SXP, primary export intensity.  Each specification is identified by a code, 
SW1-5.  Results presented in Table I are identical to those of SW for SW1 and SW2.  
Results differ slightly for SW3, SW4 and SW5.  Most of the differences are negligible Page 19 of 40  
 
except for INV7089, where the coefficient from Table I is roughly one tenth of that of 
SW
3. 
All variables have rather stable coefficients, both in terms of sign and magnitude.  
LGDPEA is consistently negative, indicative of conditional convergence.  All variables 
are significant at 10%.  DTT7090 plays a positive role for growth in this sample.  SW 
introduce this variable to rule out the possibility that adverse trends in global export 
prices could explain the coefficient of SXP, the share of primary exports in GDP.  Their 
main finding is that SXP has a negative and significant coefficient.  The coefficient on 
SOPEN is positive, open economies grow faster in this sample.  INV7089 has a positive 
impact on growth as predicted by the neo-classical growth model.  The Rule of Law is 
favorable to growth. 
In Table II, SXP is replaced by data that has been collected on (the logarithm of 
the ratio of) land (to population in 1971, labeled LAND), fuel reserves per 1000 
inhabitants (OILR, GASR, and COALR) and mineral reserves per 1000 inhabitants (the 
principal components of which are denoted as MINR1 and MINR2).  In all other respects 
these regressions are identical to those of SW.  Each specification is identified by a code, 
OLS1-5.  SW5 in Table I is compared to OLS5 in Table II.  Coefficients for variables 
included in both specifications are similar.  However, regressions in Table II have higher 
positive coefficients for both SOPEN and DTT7090. 
SOPEN and SXP have a correlation coefficient equal to –30% in this sample, 
countries that export primary products are closed according to SW’s criteria.  The 
negative coefficient associated with SXP in SW1-5 could be due to colinearity with 
                                                        
3 This problem has not been solved yet. There is probably a scale problem with the data received from SW 
for INV7089. Page 20 of 40  
 
SOPEN.  Once SXP is excluded from the specification, the SOPEN coefficient becomes 
more strongly positive.  This is because, according to SW, part of the detrimental effect 
that being a primary product exporter has on growth is attributed to being a closed 
country. 
It is noteworthy that the coefficient on LGDPEA70 is larger in absolute value in 
OLS7 (-1.4) than in OLS5 (-1.2).  This indicates that natural resources, given that they 
are positively correlated with income, partly capture the conditional convergence effect 
associated with being a technological frontrunner.  This type of endogeneity overstates 
any negative effect natural resources may have on economic growth and hence biases 
results against the conclusion drawn in this paper. 
The change in the coefficient for DTT7090 is intuitive.  If primary export 
intensive economies have been hurt substantially by decreases in world commodity 
prices, SXP, the share of primary export in GDP should pick up part of this effect.  
Removing SXP from the regressions should leave DDT7090 with more explanatory 
power, and a higher coefficient.  Indeed in OLS5, DTT7090 becomes significant at 5% 
whereas it was not significantly different from zero in SW5. 
LAND is negatively associated with economic growth.  Across OLS1-5, its 
highest p-value is no more than .1%.  None of the coefficients associated with fuels or 
minerals is statistically different from zero even with “alpha” of 10%.  This suggests a 
different statistical, and economic, role played by land endowments versus that played by 
fuel and mineral reserves. OLS1-4 show that this lack of individual significance is not 
due to correlation between natural resource variables and other determinants of growth 
such as SOPEN, INV7089, RL and DTT7090. Page 21 of 40  
 
Coefficients associated with fuels and minerals could be jointly significant even if 
they are not individually so.  Table III conducts joint significance tests for energy 
reserves (OILR, GASR, and COALR) and mineral reserves (i.e. MINR1 and MINR2). 
The null hypothesis that they are jointly insignificant cannot be rejected at a significance 
level of 51% for the LR Test, 32% for the LM Test and 40% for the Wald Test.  Adjusted 
2 R  is equal whether or not fuels and minerals are taken into consideration (compare in 
OLS5 with OLS7 in Table II.) 
It is worth reemphasizing the basics of statistical inference in this context. Such 
high p-values for joint (and individual) significance mean that if the null hypothesis that 
natural resources have no effect on economic growth (in the context of the present 
specifications) is rejected, there is a high risk of rejecting a correct hypothesis.  This is 
different from saying that tests lead us to accept the hypothesis that natural resources play 
no role for economic growth. 
Apart from land, natural gas is the only reserve variable which is negatively 
associated with growth in all regressions, albeit insignificantly. Other coefficients either 
have unstable signs or are always positive (coal and MINR2).  I conjecture that natural 
resources may have both positive and negative effects on growth, and these may tend to 
cancel out.  Section V explores how natural resources may affect growth. 
Table IV addresses the possibility that natural resources actually proxy for 
membership in some high or low “growth club”.  Thus, in specifications labeled D1 to 
D6, SAFRICA, LAAM, ASEAN and OECD are introduced as dummy variables 
corresponding to Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, ASEAN and OECD countries.  No 
sign change in coefficients other than that for natural resources is observed on control Page 22 of 40  
 
variables.  LAND is negatively associated with growth, although its coefficient is not 
significant when DTT7090 is introduced in D5-7. 
The coefficients for OILR, GASR, COALR and INDMIN are all individually 
insignificant. Natural gas is the only reserve variable negatively associated with growth 
in all specifications, albeit insignificantly. The MINR1 coefficient has an unstable sign 
while other coefficients are always positive (oil, coal and MINR2).  In Table III, the null 
hypothesis of coefficients equal to zero on natural resource (land excepted) would have to 
be rejected with a minimum probability of type I error reaching 65%. 
It is noteworthy that the coefficient on LGDPEA70 is larger in absolute value in 
D7 (-1.74) than in D5 (-1.62).  This indicates that natural resources, given that they are 
positively correlated with income, partly capture the conditional convergence effect 
associated with being a technological frontrunner.  This type of endogeneity overstates 
any negative effect natural resources may have on economic growth and biases results 
against my conclusion. 
Table III reports the result of a test of the null hypothesis of zero coefficients for 
regional dummy variables in D5.  This hypothesis is rejected with an alpha equal to .6%.  
Adjusted 
2 R  rises from 63% in OLS5 to 68% in D5.  Dummies play an important 
statistical role in these regressions.  When dummies are omitted, natural resource 
variables would partly pick up the effect of being a member of a “low growth club” such 
as Latin America or Sub-Saharan Africa or the effect of a set of omitted variables 
common to these countries.  For this reason, specifications D1-5 are preferred to OLS1-5. 
Table II bis and IV bis are the equivalent of Table II and IV respectively, where 
SXP, primary export intensity, has been reintroduced.  The corresponding specifications Page 23 of 40  
 
are OLS1b-5b and D1b-D5b respectively.  It is interesting to know both what happens to 
SXP and to natural resource variables when they are present together in regressions.  
Coefficients on control variables do not switch sign from Table II to Table II bis or from 
Table IV to Table IV bis. 
In both cases, the coefficient on LGDPEA70 is larger in absolute value in OLS7b 
(D7b) than in OLS5b (D5b).  Natural resources, given that they are positively correlated 
with income, partly capture the conditional convergence effect associated with being a 
technological frontrunner.  This type of endogeneity overstates any negative effect 
natural resources may have on economic growth and hence biases results against my 
conclusion. 
In Table II bis, SXP is negative and significant at maximum p-value of .5%.  
Adjusted 
2 R  increases in each of the specifications with the introduction of SXP, for 
example from 63% to 73% from OLS5 to OLS5b.  SXP plays an essential role for growth 
irrespective of the presence of the natural resource variables. 
LAND still plays a negative role for growth even in the presence of SXP, with a 
p-value varying between .1 and 10.1%.  A high value for land corresponds to a potential 
comparative advantage in agriculture, and to a tendency for countries with high values for 
LAND to specialize in agriculture.  One possible interpretation of these results is that 
land itself (and the likely specialization in agricultural production) may be detrimental to 
growth, independent of the damaging effects of primary product exports.  The assessment 
of this coefficient is subject to important caveats that are reviewed in the next section. 
OILR, COALR and MINR2 have positive and insignificant coefficients.  So does 
MINR1, except in OLS2b.  Natural Gas (GASR) is the only natural resource negatively Page 24 of 40  
 
—albeit insignificantly— associated with growth (as in Table II).  Table III reports tests 
for the null hypothesis of no natural resource effect (except for LAND).  Rejecting this 
null hypothesis is associated with probabilities of type I error ranging between 87 and 
91% depending on which joint test is used.  The risk of rejecting a correct hypothesis is 
too important to be ignored. 
In Table IV bis, LAND is insignificant in some specifications.  Controlling for 
unmeasured regional characteristics and missing variables through dummy variables, the 
presence of SXP makes LAND redundant.  This indicates that the effect of land on 
economic growth may not be robust.  The high number of regressors (up to 17) to 
observations varying from 71 to 87 makes this insignificance difficult to interpret.  In 
Table III, joint tests of significance of regional dummy variables reject the null 
hypothesis with p-values ranging from .6 to 1%. 
In contrast, corresponding tests for joint significance of natural resources yield 
remarkably high p-values ranging from 84 to 90%.  This implies, as SW conclude, that 
SXP is a “diehard” determinant of economic growth.  To further verify the robustness of 
SXP, SW check if SXP is significant in regression specifications from four previous 
studies.  They conclude that natural resource export intensity and openness are significant 
when added to regression specifications of other studies; adjusted 
2 R ’s are raised 
substantially and some previously insignificant variables become statistically significant.  
A similar test for fuel and mineral reserves variables has been conducted (not reported 
but available upon request.)  In none of the specifications proposed by other authors are 
the individual coefficients on reserves significant at any acceptable p-value. Page 25 of 40  
 
In Barro’s [1991] specification, joint tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of no 
effect of natural resources at a p-value ranging between 33 and 46%. In De Long and 
Summers’ [1991] specification, the p-value ranges between 37 and 49%.  Using the 
specification proposed by Mankiw, Romer and Weil [1992], this p-value varies from 34 
and 40%. Finally, using King and Levine’s [1993] specification, the p-value ranges 
between 65 and 73%. 
V. The channels of operation 
This section attempts to explain the lack of individual and joint significance of the fuel 
and mineral reserves variable.  Table VIII reports coefficients of linear correlation 
between LAND, OILR, GASR, COALR, MINR1, and MINR2 with a number of 
variables considered to be important for economic growth.  Table VIII is divided into five 
sub-tables.  Table VIII-A reports (partial) linear correlations between land, fuel and 
mineral reserves and school attendance variables.  Table VIII-B uses variables that are 
regarded as “symptoms” of “Dutch disease.”  Table VIII-C uses saving and investment 
rates, as well as investment in equipment and other types of structures.   Table VIII-D 
uses two indicators of how market oriented economic policy is.  Finally, Table VIII-E 
uses indexes of the quality of the political infrastructure.  
Causality cannot be determined in this context, even less so than in the case of 
growth regressions, since neither endogeneity nor the effect of other variables is 
controlled for.  I propose this approach only as a preliminary step towards the collection 
of stylized facts regarding land as well as fuel and mineral reserves, with the hope that 
these stylized facts prove useful in more elaborate analyses.  I am looking for signs of 
“positive” and “negative channels”, through which natural resources affect economic Page 26 of 40  
 
growth in favorable and unfavorable ways.  Land, oil and gas reserves, coal reserves, and 
mineral reserves are considered in separate sub-sections as they reveal different patterns 
of correlation. 
Land 
LAND is consistently positively correlated with variables considered to be detrimental to 
growth, and is negatively correlated with variables considered to be favorable to 
economic growth.  There is overwhelming preliminary evidence that land is positively 
correlated with poor education, poor quality of political institutions, interventionist 
economic policy, less favorable investment-saving characteristics, and “Dutch disease” 
related effects. 
In Table VIII-A, LAND is negatively correlated with the primary school 
enrollment rate (PRI70), the secondary school enrollment rate (SEC70) and the change in 
the total years of education in the population over age 15 from 1970 to 1990 
(DTYR7090). 
In Table VIII-E, LAND is correlated with a higher risk of government repudiation 
of contracts (negative correlation with GRC), a higher risk of expropriation (negative 
correlation with RE), lower bureaucratic quality (BQ), higher index of corruption in 
government (negative correlation with CORR), a lower rule of law (RL) and a higher 
number of revolutions and coups per year, averaged over the period 1970-1985 
(REVCOUP).  LAND is only correlated with a very slightly lower number of 
assassinations per million inhabitants per year over 1970-1985 (ASSASSP). 
In Table VIII-D, LAND is negatively correlated with the fraction of years during 
the period 1970-1990 in which the country is rated as an open economy according to the Page 27 of 40  
 
criteria proposed by Sachs and Warner [1995a] (SOPEN); it is also positively correlated 
with the ratio of real government consumption spending net of spending on the military 
and education to real GDP (GVXDXE). 
In Table VIII-C, LAND is negatively correlated with national saving as a percent 
of GDP (NS7089), with the ratio of real gross domestic investment to real GDP 
(INV7089), with investment spending on equipment as a fraction of GDP from 1970-
1985 (EQUIP), and with investment spending on structures other than equipment as a 
fraction of GDP from 1970-1985 (NES).  Investment goods are also more expensive in 
countries with large values of land, LAND is positively correlated with the log of the 
ratio of the investment deflator to the GDP deflator in 1970 (LPIP70). 
Finally, land is coupled in Table VIII-B with “Dutch disease” symptoms. LAND 
is negatively correlated with real growth in the non-natural resource sector of the 
economy (GNR7090) and with the change in the share of manufacturing exports in total 
exports (DMX7090).   Moreover, LAND is associated with a higher ratio of value added 
in services to value added in manufacturing (SERVS70), a smaller share of 
manufacturing exports in total exports (SMX70), and a higher share of exports of primary 
products in 1970 (SXP). 
Interpreting these results is tricky and should be done with caution.  One can 
imagine that by locking a country into an agricultural trade export pattern, a relatively 
high endowment in land, can prevent a country from industrializing, and thus from 
reaping the benefits of learning-by-doing associated with industrial production.  Lower 
productivity and growth can in turn be associated with a number of detrimental effects on Page 28 of 40  
 
education and political institutions, making these variables the outcome of trade 
specialization rather than the cause. 
However, the flip side of land area per capita, is population concentration, which 
because of network and human capital externalities, is beneficial to productivity.  
Population concentration increases may lead to acceleration in the rate of technological 
innovation as in new growth theory or in empirical models like Michael Kremer [1993].  
Population concentration may also capture the phase of demographic transition which a 
country is in.  Land “champions” in this sample, besides Australia and New Zealand, are 
typically sub-Saharan countries like Botswana, Mauritania, Congo, Zambia, Mali, 
Madagascar, Somalia, and South Africa or Latin American countries like Uruguay, 
Paraguay, and Argentina. 
Oil and Gas Reserves 
The case of oil and gas reserves is a mixed one.  Oil and gas seem to have “positive” and 
“negative” channels of interaction with economic growth.  There is evidence that oil and 
gas reserves are associated with better education, more market-oriented economic policy, 
and more favorable investment-saving characteristics.  However, they come with some 
“Dutch disease” symptoms.  The evidence is mixed regarding the quality of political 
institutions. 
In Table VIII-A, OILR and GASR are positively correlated with the primary 
(PRI70) and secondary (SEC70) school enrollment rate as well as with the change in the 
total years of education in the population over age 15 from 1970 to 1990 (DTYR7090). 
In Table VIII-E, OILR and GASR are associated with a higher risk of government 
repudiation of contracts (GRC) and a higher risk of expropriation (RE). However, oil and Page 29 of 40  
 
gas reserves do not seem to be associated with corruption in government (CORR) and 
they even come with somewhat better bureaucratic quality (BQ), stronger rule of law 
(RL), a somewhat lower number of revolutions and coups per year (REVCOUP) and 
slightly fewer assassinations (ASSASSP). 
In Table VIII-D, OILR and GASR are positively correlated with the Sachs and 
Warner openness variable (SOPEN), and they are negatively correlated with the ratio of 
real government consumption spending net of spending on the military and education to 
real GDP (GVXDXE). 
In Table VIII-C, OILR and GNW are positively correlated with national saving 
(NS7089), with real gross domestic investment (INV7089), and with investment spending 
on structures (NES).  OILR is positively correlated with investment spending on 
equipment (EQUIP).  Investment goods are cheaper in countries with large reserves of 
natural gas and oil (LPIP70).  The only exception is that GASR is slightly negatively 
correlated with investment spending on equipment (EQUIP).   
In Table VIII-B, oil and gas reserves are associated with some “Dutch disease” 
symptoms.  Larger reserves of oil and gas come with slower real growth in the non-
natural resource sector of the economy (GNR7090), a smaller share of manufacturing 
exports in total exports (SMX70), a smaller change in the share of manufacturing exports 
in total exports (DMX7090), and a higher share of primary products in exports (SXP). 
Nevertheless, higher oil and gas reserves come with a lower ratio of value added in 
services to value added in manufacturing (SERVS70). 
The preliminary nature of this evidence suggests caution in interpreting the 
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better education, allow for consensus on market-oriented economic policies, higher 
bureaucratic quality as well as higher saving and investment rates.  Oil and gas 
“champions” in this sample like Norway and Australia are examples.  On the other hand, 
the endogenous character of reserve data suggest that the causality may actually run the 
other way:  countries with higher human capital may have an easier time discovering (and 
exploiting) their oil and natural gas resources. 
Another reading of the evidence is that oil and gas extraction draws resources 
away from the manufacturing sector and leads to feeding frenzy by the ruling elite 
through expropriation (of natural resources) and repudiation of contracts, as illustrated in 
the political economy literature.  However, oil and gas extraction does not increase the 
size of the service sector at the expense of the manufacturing sector as is expected in a 
standard Dutch disease model.  Oil or gas “champions” Venezuela, Iran, Congo 
Brazzaville, Trinidad & Tobago and Algeria are examples. 
Coal reserves 
The case of coal reserves is also mixed but it takes a different form from that of oil, gas 
and mineral reserves. Coal reserves are associated with more market oriented economic 
policies and with more favorable investment-saving market characteristics.  The evidence 
is unclear regarding education, political institutions, and “Dutch disease” symptoms. 
In Table VIII-A, COALR is negatively correlated with the primary school 
enrollment rate (PRI70) and the change in total years of education in the population over 
age 15 from 1970 to 1990 (DTYR7090).  However, TRC is more strongly positively 
correlated with the secondary school enrollment rate (SEC70). Page 31 of 40  
 
In Table VIII-E, TRC is associated with a higher risk of government repudiation 
of contracts (GRC) and a higher risk of expropriation (RE).  However, coal-abundant 
countries see a lower number of revolutions and coups per year (REVCOUP) and fewer 
assassinations (ASSASSP).  Furthermore, TRC is associated with lower corruption in 
government (CORR), better bureaucratic quality (BQ) and stronger rule of law (RL). 
In Table VIII-D TRC is positively correlated with the SW criterion of openness 
(SOPEN) and it is negatively correlated with the ratio of real government consumption 
spending net of spending on the military and education to real GDP (GVXDXE). 
In Table VIII-C TRC is positively correlated with national saving (NS7089), with 
domestic investment (INV7089), with investment spending on equipment (EQUIP) and 
with investment spending on structures other than equipment (NES).  Investment goods 
are cheaper (LPIP70) in countries with large reserves of coal.   
In Table VIII-B larger reserves of coal come with a slightly smaller change in the 
share of manufacturing exports in total exports (DMX7090) and a higher ratio of value 
added in services to value added in manufacturing (SERVS70).  Nonetheless, coal 
abundance is associated with a larger share of manufacturing exports in total exports 
(SMX70), and a smaller share of exports of primary products in 1970 (SXP).  Coal 
abundance is clearly associated with faster real growth in the non-natural resource sector 
of the economy (GNR7090). 
One possible interpretation of this evidence is that coal reserves are associated 
with a large manufacturing sector, albeit decreasing in size, a growing service sector, and 
low primary export intensity.  This reminds us of the production structure of many 
industrialized countries.  Coal-abundant countries in this sample like Australia and the Page 32 of 40  
 
U.S.A. illustrate this case well.  These facts could explain higher saving and investment 
rates, as well as heavier investment in equipment and infrastructure.  However, it is not 
possible to rule out reverse causality.  Another possible interpretation of partial 
coefficients is that coal, like oil and gas, leads to some feeding frenzy by the ruling elite 
through expropriation and repudiation of contracts. 
Mineral Reserves 
The case of mineral reserves is similarly mixed:  minerals seem to have both “positive” 
and “negative” channels of effect on economic growth.  There is preliminary evidence 
that oil and gas reserves are associated with better education and growth enhancing 
economic policy. They are generally associated with more favorable investment-saving 
characteristics.  The evidence in favor of the presence of some “Dutch disease” 
symptoms is, at worst, mixed.  The evidence is unclear regarding the quality of political 
institutions. 
While MINR1 is associated with a lower primary school enrollment rate (PRI70), 
and a smaller change in the total years of education (DTYR7090), MINR2 is actually 
positively correlated with both of these variables (see Table VIII-A).  Both MINR1 and 
MINR2 are strongly associated with a higher secondary school enrollment rate (SEC70). 
In Table VIII-E, both mineral reserve indexes are inversely correlated with the 
risk of government repudiation of contracts (GRC).  MINR1 is slightly correlated a 
higher risk of expropriation (RE), but MINR2 is slightly inversely correlated with such 
risk.  In contrast, both mineral indexes are correlated with a lower number of 
assassinations (ASSASSP), with lower corruption in government (CORR), better 
bureaucratic quality (BQ) and stronger rule of law (RL).  Finally, while MINR1 is Page 33 of 40  
 
positively correlated with the number of revolutions and coups (REVCOUP), MINR2 is 
very slightly negatively correlated with the number of revolutions and coups. 
In Table VIII-D, MINR1 and MINR2 are positively correlated with the Sachs and 
Warner openness index (SOPEN).  They are also negatively correlated with the ratio of 
real government consumption spending, net of spending on the military and education, to 
real GDP (GVXDXE). 
In Table VIII-C, MINR1 and MINR2 are positively correlated with national 
saving (NS7089), with real gross domestic investment (INV7089), with investment 
spending on equipment (EQUIP) and with investment spending on structures (NES).  
Investment goods are cheaper (LPIP70) in countries with large mineral reserves. 
In Table VIII-B, larger mineral reserves are associated with a larger share of 
manufacturing exports in total exports (SMX70), with a lower ratio of value added in 
services to value added in manufacturing (SERVS70), and a somewhat lower share of 
exports of primary products (SXP).  These three elements cast doubt on the existence of a 
“Dutch disease” channel associated with mineral abundance. While MINR1 is correlated 
with a slightly slower rate of real growth in the non-natural resource sector of the 
economy (GNR7090), and a slightly smaller change in the share of manufacturing 
exports in total exports (DMX7090), MINR2 has a slightly positive correlation with 
changes in these variables.  MINR1 “champions” are Australia, Canada, South Africa and 
the U.S.A.; MINR2 “champions” are Canada, the U.S.A., Chile, Bolivia, Peru and Spain. Page 34 of 40  
 
Summary 
Table IX presents a summary of the findings presented in this section.  Although 
conclusions are phrased in terms of causality, these are preliminary propositions and the 
nature of the evidence does not warrant interpretation in terms of causality. 
School attendance may be hampered by a higher land endowment but fostered by 
oil, gas, and mineral reserves. The evidence is mixed regarding coal reserves.  Another 
possible interpretation is that causality runs the other way and that human capital helps 
oil, gas, and mineral discoveries and their exploitation.  These interpretations need not be 
mutually exclusive. 
The working of the political infrastructure seems to be hampered by a high land 
endowment. Things are unclear regarding oil, gas, coal and mineral reserves.  The pattern 
for resources other than land is that resource abundance leads to abuse of power by the 
government through expropriation and repudiation of contracts.  This is in accordance 
with Gelb’s [1988] observation that natural resource production generates high economic 
rents and that governments earn most of the rents from that exploitation.  However, 
resource abundance is positively associated with other indicators of the prevalence of the 
rule of law and bureaucratic performance.  Another possible interpretation could be that 
the rule of law and bureaucratic performance facilitate discovery of resources. 
The aggregate saving and investment rates, and the rate of investment in 
equipment and other structures are lower in the case of high land endowment but higher 
for countries with abundant oil, gas, and mineral reserves.  Even though reverse causality 
cannot be ruled out, this supports the idea that oil, gas, and mineral production revenues 
help fund investment projects as Angus Deaton [1999] suggests.  Similarly, higher Page 35 of 40  
 
relative land endowments come with interventionist economic policy, whereas oil, gas, 
and mineral reserves are associated with more market-oriented economic policies. 
“Dutch disease” symptoms seem present in the case of land, oil and gas.  The 
evidence is mixed for coal.  Larger mineral reserves actually foster trade specialization in 
manufacturing and a smaller relative size of the non-traded (service) sector. Minerals are 
associated with a somewhat lower share of primary product exports in GDP.  The 
evidence is ambiguous regarding the effect of mineral reserves on the real growth in the 
non-natural resource sector of the economy and the evolution of the share of 
manufacturing exports in total exports. 
VI. Conclusions 
SW argue that one of the characteristic features of modern economic growth is that 
resource-rich economies have grown less rapidly than those that are resource-poor.  This 
may be true of land, which is seen as one of the main factor endowments for agriculture.  
The fact that land per capita is the inverse of population concentration warrants cautious 
interpretation of this result.  Actual data on fuel and minerals reserves show that natural 
resource abundance has not been a significant structural determinant of economic growth 
between 1970 and 1989. 
Even in the presence of reserve variables, primary export intensity still 
significantly hampers economic growth.  Combining this with the absence of a significant 
role played by the reserves themselves brings us to the conclusion that, in terms of 
economic development, what matters most is what countries do with their natural 
resources.  I conjecture that this can be traced back to the type of learning process 
involved in exploiting and developing the natural resources.  Looking at R&D and patent Page 36 of 40  
 
data with an eye on natural resources is a promising path for future research.   I consider 
this question in a separate paper currently underway. 
Analysis of partial correlations between land as well as fuel and mineral reserves 
and a number of determinants of economic growth reveals a complicated reality.  While 
land is negatively associated with all determinants of economic growth, the same is not 
true of minerals, coal, oil or natural gas.  Natural resources may affect economic growth 
through both positive and negative channels. 
School attendance is positively correlated with oil, gas, and mineral reserves. The 
pattern for resources other than land is that resource abundance tends to lead to abuse of 
power through expropriation and repudiation of contracts by the government.  However, 
resource abundance is often positively associated with other indicators of the rule of law 
and bureaucratic performance.  The aggregate saving and investment rates, and the rate of 
investment in equipment and other structures are higher for countries with abundant oil, 
gas, and mineral reserves.  In addition, oil, gas, and mineral reserves are associated with 
more market-oriented economic policies. 
 “Dutch disease” symptoms seem present in the case of land, oil and gas.  The 
evidence is mixed for coal.  Coal and mineral reserves are associated with trade 
specialization in manufacturing and with a somewhat lower share of primary product 
exports in GDP.  Mineral reserves are also associated with a smaller relative size of the 
non-traded (service) sector. 
This coexistence of both “positive” and “negative channels” through which 
natural resources affect economic growth would explain the lack of significance of the Page 37 of 40  
 
fuel and mineral reserve variables.  Nonetheless, plausible reverse causality running from 
the channels to fuel and mineral reserves further complicates the analysis. 
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PFigure VIII: Oil Reserves vs. Production
















PFigure IX: Natural Gas Reserves vs. Production
















PFigure X: Coal Reserves vs. Production














Method of estimation = Ordinary Least Squares
Dependent variable: GEA70
Specification
Variable SW1 SW2 SW3 SW4 SW5
C 3.29 * 8.87 ** 10.74 ** 14.34 ** 14.66 **
1.78 1.51 1.40 1.56 1.55
LGDPEA70 -0.11 -0.96 ** -1.37 ** -1.77 ** -1.79 **
0.20 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.20
SXP -9.43 ** -6.96 ** -6.75 ** -10.42 ** -10.16 **
1.99 1.53 1.36 1.49 1.48
SOPEN -- 3.06 ** 2.21 ** 1.15 ** 1.19 **
0.38 0.38 0.41 0.40
INV7089 -- -- 0.11 ** 0.09 ** 0.07 **
0.02 0.02 0.03
RL -- -- -- 0.33 ** 0.38 **
0.10 0.10
DTT7090 -- -- -- -- 0.08 *
0.05
Number of observations: 87.00 87.00 87.00 71.00 71.00
Std. error of regression 1.62 1.22 1.08 0.92 0.91
Adjusted R-squared 0.20 0.55 0.64 0.73 0.74Table II




Variable OLS1 OLS2 OLS3 OLS4 OLS5 OLS6 OLS7
C 1.574 6.424 ** 8.041 ** 8.890 ** 9.066 ** 10.085 ** 9.066 **
1.734 1.671 1.527 2.007 1.908 1.821 1.908
LGDPEA70 -0.058 -0.763 ** -1.137 ** -1.258 ** -1.234 ** -1.368 ** -1.234 **
0.213 0.215 0.208 0.270 0.257 0.244 0.257
SOPEN -- 2.681 ** 1.749 ** 1.191 ** 1.062 ** 1.353 ** 1.062 **
0.456 0.453 0.533 0.509 0.490 0.509
INV7089 -- -- 0.112 ** 0.095 ** 0.071 ** 0.063 ** 0.071 **
0.024 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030
RL -- -- -- 0.228 * 0.298 ** 0.321 ** 0.298 **
0.128 0.125 0.125 0.125
DTT7090 -- -- -- -- 0.166 ** 0.118 ** 0.166 **
0.061 0.056 0.061
LAND -0.716 ** -0.409 ** -0.393 ** -0.399 ** -0.434 ** -0.393 ** -0.434 **
0.119 0.113 0.100 0.116 0.111 0.107 0.111
OILR 79.391 65.380 12.368 -57.964 -58.270 -- --
282.360 236.618 210.780 212.291 201.755
GASR -54.014 -13.130 -25.475 -14.412 -45.614 -- --
62.081 52.485 46.761 47.288 46.376
COALR 0.478 0.430 0.365 0.238 0.125 -- --
0.750 0.628 0.559 0.579 0.552
MIN1R -0.051 -0.255 -0.210 -0.097 0.072 0.112 --
0.631 0.530 0.472 0.482 0.462 0.136
MIN2R 0.225 0.103 0.118 0.080 0.072 -- --
0.250 0.210 0.118 0.191 0.182
Number of observations: 87 87 87 71 71 71 71
Std. error of regression 1.537 1.288 1.145 1.144 1.087 1.091 1.087
Adjusted R-squared 0.280 0.494 0.600 0.585 0.625 0.623 0.625Table II bis




Variable OLS1b OLS2b OLS3b OLS4b OLS5b OLS6b OLS7b
C 3.399 * 8.174 ** 9.657 ** 13.310 ** 13.070 ** 13.595 ** 13.561 **
1.779 1.651 1.483 1.842 1.794 1.619 1.609
LGDPEA70 -0.188 -0.886 ** -1.243 ** -1.644 ** -1.597 ** -1.668 ** -1.666 **
0.209 0.205 0.195 0.233 0.228 0.207 0.206
SOPEN -- 2.663 ** 1.758 ** 0.994 * 0.924 ** 1.022 ** 1.062 **
0.428 0.420 0.440 0.429 0.406 0.396
INV7089 -- -- 0.108 ** 0.086 ** 0.071 ** 0.069 ** 0.069 **
0.022 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.024
RL -- -- -- 0.308 ** 0.349 ** 0.358 ** 0.359 **
0.107 0.106 0.103 0.102
DTT7090 -- -- -- -- 0.111 ** 0.088 * 0.085 *
0.052 0.046 0.046
SXP -5.694 ** -5.565 ** -5.288 ** -9.359 ** -8.602 ** -8.881 ** -8.950 **
1.991 1.635 1.439 1.724 1.713 1.580 1.565
LAND -0.586 ** -0.283 * -0.274 ** -0.173 * -0.215 ** -0.189 * -0.166 *
0.123 0.112 0.098 0.104 0.103 0.095 0.084
OILR 116.792 102.029 48.736 40.429 32.259 -- --
270.656 222.293 195.744 175.768 170.847
GASR -53.843 -13.245 -25.225 -10.240 -31.440 -- --
59.438 49.250 43.370 38.952 39.154
COALR 0.164 0.124 0.076 -0.179 -0.221 -- --
0.726 0.596 0.524 0.483 0.470
MIN1R 0.162 -0.046 -0.012 0.179 0.270 0.058 --
0.609 0.501 0.441 0.400 0.391 0.112
MIN2R 0.127 0.009 0.028 -0.021 -0.018 -- --
0.241 0.199 0.175 0.159 0.154
Number of observations: 87 87 87 71 71 71 71
Std. error of regression 1.471 1.208 1.062 0.942 0.915 0.895 0.890
Adjusted R-squared 0.340 0.555 0.650 0.719 0.734 0.746 0.749Table III
Specification H0: Variable df p-value
OLS5 OILR, GASR, COALR, MIN1R&R2 are jointly insignificaLM Test Chi Sqare=5.645493 5 Dut 0.3423
LR Test Chi Sqare=5.882596 5 0.3178
Wald Test F Variable=1.036591 5 60 0.4046
Specification H0: Variable df p-value
OLS5 bis OILR, GASR, COALR, MIN1R&R2 are jointly insignificaLM Test Chi Sqare=1.803897 5 0.8756
LR Test Chi Sqare=1.827209 5 0.8725
Wald Test F Variable=0.3024045 5 58 0.9095
Specification H0: Variable df p-value
D5 OILR, GASR, COALR, MIN1R&R2 are jointly insignificaLM Test Chi Sqare=3.222845 5 0.6657
LR Test Chi Sqare=3.298282 5 0.6541
Wald Test F Variable=0.5325668 5 56 0.7507
Specification H0: Variable df p-value
D5 bis OILR, GASR, COALR, MIN1R&R2 are jointly insignificaLM Test Chi Sqare=2.048576 5 0.8424
LR Test Chi Sqare=2.078711 5 0.8382
Wald Test F Variable=0.3208726 5 54 0.8983
Specification H0: Variable df p-value
D5 D1, D2, D3, & D4 are jointly insignificant LM Test Chi Sqare=14.29342 4 0.0064
LR Test Chi Sqare=15.96006 4 0.0031
Wald Test F Variable=3.465815 4 55 0.0135
Specification H0: Variable df p-value
S5 OILR, GASR, COALR, MIN1R&R2 are jointly insignificaLM Test Chi Sqare=9.080157 5 0.1059
LR Test Chi Sqare=9.543899 5 0.0892
Wald Test F Variable=1.754317 5 83 0.1314
Specification H0: Variable df p-value
S5 D1, D2, D3, & D4 are jointly insignificant LM Test Chi Sqare=20.49585 4 0.0004
LR Test Chi Sqare=23.08709 4 0.0001
Wald Test F Variable=5.708257 4 83 0.0004Table IV Method of estimation = Ordinary Least Squares Dependent variable: GEA70
Specification D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7
C 6.539 ** 8.637 ** 9.351 ** 13.208 ** 13.060 ** 14.019 ** 13.977 **
2.428 2.263 2.120ase 2.500 2.412 2.256 2.229
SAFRICA -1.001 * -0.997 ** -0.737 * -1.902 ** -1.656 ** -1.727 ** -1.740 **
0.508 0.461 0.436 0.521 0.514 0.496 0.488
LAAM -0.788 -0.515 -0.563 -0.943 ** -0.678 -0.605 -0.622
0.494 0.454 0.423 0.415 0.417 0.386 0.373
ASEAN 1.504 ** 1.027 * 0.249 0.758 0.858 0.965 * 0.981 *
0.610 0.566 0.573 0.581 0.562 0.550 0.541
OECD 1.378 ** 0.542 0.188 0.210 0.417 0.498 0.483
0.513 0.508 0.485 0.519 0.508 0.497 0.487
LGDPEA70 -0.657 ** -0.983 ** -1.221 ** -1.655 ** -1.617 ** -1.742 ** -1.737 **
0.296 0.280 0.270 0.318 0.307 0.286 0.283
SOPEN -- 2.117 ** 1.576 ** 0.747 0.649 0.830 * 0.846 *
0.514 0.504 0.527 0.510 0.489 0.479
INV7089 -- -- 0.095 ** 0.059 * 0.039 0.031 0.031
0.027 0.030 0.031 0.030 0.029
RL -- -- -- 0.356 ** 0.389 ** 0.411 ** 0.413 **
0.128 0.124 0.121 0.120
DTT7090 -- -- -- -- 0.134 ** 0.103 * 0.101 *
0.059 0.054 0.053
LAND -0.395 ** -0.236 * -0.310 ** -0.144 -0.204 -0.162 -0.149
0.134 0.127 0.121 0.137 0.135 0.129 0.108
OILR 189.387 141.456 113.879 100.794 60.343 -- --
260.537 236.877 221.030 202.874 196.476
GASR -59.066 -28.166 -45.232 -37.320 -51.963 -- --
58.427 53.586 50.209 46.289 45.106
COALR 0.257 0.350 0.316 0.090 0.026 -- --
0.663 0.603 0.562 0.530 0.512
MIN1R -0.048 -0.247 -0.189 -0.062 0.061 0.026 --
0.557 0.508 0.474 0.440 0.427 0.129
MIN2R 0.113 0.065 0.096 0.044 0.044 -- --
0.220 0.200 0.187 0.174 0.168
Number of observations: 87 87 87 71 71 71 71
Std. error of regression 1.350 1.226 1.143 1.037 1.000 0.988 0.980
Adjusted R-squared 0.444 0.542 0.601 0.659 0.683 0.690 0.695Table IV bis Method of estimation = Ordinary Least Squares Dependent variable: GEA70
Specification
Variable D1b D2b D3b D4b D5b D6b D7b
C 6.250 ** 8.405 ** 9.152 ase 13.927 ** 13.773 ** 14.200 ** 14.229 **
2.411 2.199 2.006 2.162 2.127 1.965 1.941
SAFRICA -0.685 -0.576 -0.196 -1.037 ** -0.937 * -0.918 * -0.912 *
0.541 0.482 0.448 0.489 0.484 0.469 0.463
LAAM -0.728 -0.414 -0.447 -0.823 ** -0.654 -0.529 -0.517
0.491 0.443 0.402 0.359 0.366 0.337 0.326
ASEAN 1.506 ** 0.995 * 0.120 0.820 0.883 * 0.921 * 0.911 *
0.604 0.550 0.544 0.501 0.494 0.479 0.471
OECD 1.194 ** 0.236 -0.224 -0.253 -0.079 -0.028 -0.015
0.521 0.510 0.477 0.459 0.462 0.449 0.438
LGDPEA70 -0.579 * -0.902 ** -1.150 ** -1.644 ** -1.619 ** -1.689 ** -1.693 **
0.297 0.274 0.256 0.274 0.270 0.249 0.246
SOPEN -- 2.271 ** 1.701 ** 0.781 * 0.713 * 0.804 * 0.792 *
0.504 0.478 0.454 0.448 0.426 0.417
INV7089 -- -- 0.106 ** 0.061 ** 0.048 * 0.045 * 0.045 *
0.026 0.026 0.027 0.026 0.026
RL -- -- -- 0.396 ** 0.415 ** 0.423 ** 0.422 **
0.110 0.109 0.106 0.105
DTT7090 -- -- -- -- 0.090 0.077 * 0.079 *
0.053 0.047 0.046
SXP -3.191 -4.256 ** -5.163 ** -8.253 ** -7.624 ** -7.644 ** -7.620 **
2.017 1.812 1.660 1.831 1.837 1.718 1.697
LAND -0.349 ** -0.164 -0.231 * 0.030 -0.023 -0.013 -0.023
0.135 0.127 0.117 0.124 0.126 0.117 0.098
OILR 193.172 143.017 112.610 149.536 118.583 -- --
257.976 229.962 208.969 175.272 173.223
GASR -57.953 -24.434 -42.661 -33.481 -43.633 -- --
57.855 52.045 47.476 39.924 39.688
COALR 0.075 0.115 0.027 -0.275 -0.291 -- --
0.667 0.594 0.540 0.464 0.457
MIN1R 0.085 -0.083 0.016 0.181 0.246 -0.018 --
0.558 0.498 0.453 0.383 0.378 0.113
MIN2R 0.070 0.004 0.027 -0.050 -0.043 -- --
0.220 0.196 0.178 0.152 0.149
Number of observations: 87 87 87 71 71 71 71
Std. error of regression 1.337 1.190 1.081 0.894 0.879 0.860 0.853
Adjusted R-squared 0.455 0.568 0.644 0.746 0.755 0.765 0.769Table V
Method of estimation = Ordinary Least Squares
Dependent variable: SXP Dutch disease
Specification
Variable S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7
C 0.139 ** 0.136 ** 0.202 * 0.134 ** 0.092 ** 0.095 ** 0.134 **
0.011 0.013 0.106 0.012 0.021 0.019 0.012
SAFRICA -- -- -- -- 0.078 ** 0.072 ** --
0.025 0.025
LAAM -- -- -- -- 0.032 0.032 --
0.026 0.025
ASEAN -- -- -- -- -0.024 -0.036 --
0.032 0.032
OECD -- -- -- -- -0.062 ** -0.055 * --
0.028 0.028
SOPEN -0.061 ** -0.060 ** -0.049 * -0.023 0.052 * 0.031 -0.023
0.020 0.020 0.026 0.024 0.029 0.028 0.024
ACCESS -- 0.014 0.009 -- -- -- --
0.023 0.025
LGDPEA70 -- -- -0.008 -- -- -- --
0.013
LAND -- -- -- 0.021 ** 0.015 * 0.008 0.021 **
0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007
OILR -- -- -- 5.965 1.722 -- 5.965
15.255 14.547 15.255
GASR -- -- -- -0.606 1.508 -- -0.606
3.355 3.254 3.355
COALR -- -- -- -0.031 ** -0.035 ** -- -0.031 **
0.014 0.013 0.014
MIN1R -- -- -- 0.016 0.024 * -- 0.016
0.014 0.013 0.014
MIN2R -- -- -- -0.013 -0.010 -- -0.013
0.010 0.009 0.010
Number of observations: 95 95 95 95 95 95 95
Std. error of regression 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.084 0.076 0.077 0.084
Adjusted R-squared 0.081 0.075 0.069 0.131 0.286 0.255 0.131Table VI - Correlations between Reserves and Production
OILR GASR COALR MIN1R MIN2R OILP GASP COALP MIN1P MIN2P
OILR 100%
GASR 84% 100%
COALR -2% 6% 100%
MIN1R 4% 15% 77% 100%
MIN2R -4% -3% -23% 0% 100%
OILP 89% 82% -1% 10% 1% 100%
GASP 55% 71% 7% 25% 28% 71% 100%
COALP -1% 7% 80% 89% -20% 1% 13% 100%
MIN1P 2% 12% 77% 97% -8% 6% 19% 89% 100%
MIN2P 2% -1% 18% -4% -82% -1% -19% 20% 0% 100%Table VII - "Non-Parametric Test"
Land Oil Gas Coal MIN1R MIN2R
Countries Cameroon Canada Cameroon Canada Canada Cameroon
Canada Egypt Canada China China Canada
Indonesia Egypt Norway Norway China












Count 2664 4 1 0
17 out of total of 29 countries with growth rates higher than 2 percentTable VIII Channels of Operation - Partial linear correlations
A. Education B. Political Infrastructure
pri70 dtyr7090 sec70 grc re assassp revcoup bq corr rl
LAND (0.19) (0.16) (0.14) LAND (0.38) (0.37) (0.01) 0.13 (0.23) (0.19) (0.21)
OILR 0.04 0.10 0.00 OILR (0.10) (0.03) (0.04) (0.00) 0.03 (0.00) 0.07
GASR 0.01 0.10 0.06 GASR (0.21) (0.22) (0.05) (0.05) 0.06 0.00 0.07
COALR (0.12) (0.12) 0.18 COALR 0.04 0.05 (0.07) (0.16) 0.22 0.21 0.21
MIN1R (0.08) (0.18) 0.37 MIN1R (0.07) (0.01) (0.06) (0.11) 0.23 0.21 0.22
MIN2R 0.06 0.04 0.26 MIN2R (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) 0.01 0.15 0.12 0.14
C. Savings and Investment D. Orientation of economic policy
inv7089 ns7089 lpip70 nes equip linv7089 sopen gvxdxe
LAND (0.21) (0.38) 0.12 (0.12) (0.13) (0.16) LAND (0.39) 0.21
OILR 0.21 0.26 (0.11) 0.08 (0.01) 0.17 OILR 0.00 (0.15)
GASR 0.24 0.29 (0.09) 0.16 0.04 0.20 GASR 0.02 (0.22)
COALR 0.21 0.16 (0.12) 0.17 0.50 0.18 COALR 0.15 (0.16)
MIN1R 0.20 0.14 (0.16) 0.05 0.07 0.17 MIN1R 0.19 (0.16)
MIN2R 0.10 0.04 (0.13) 0.08 0.03 0.11 MIN2R 0.17 (0.10)
E. Dutch Disease
sxp gnr7090 dmx7090 servs70 smx70
LAND 0.33 (0.30) (0.29) 15% (0.41)
OILR 0.07 (0.08) (0.22) -7% (0.04)
GASR 0.03 (0.07) (0.22) -8% (0.04)
COALR (0.08) 0.33 (0.01) 22% 0.02
MIN1R (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) -17% 0.00
MIN2R (0.07) 0.01 0.03 -9% 0.08Table IX: Summary of channels of influence
Education Politics Investment Economic policy Dutch disease
Land - - - - -
Oil and Gas + ? "+" + "-"
Coal ? ? + + ?
Minerals "+" ? + + ? / "+"